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ABSTRACT
Objectives: The study examined medical care
utilisation by health insurance status changes.
Setting: The Korean Welfare Panel Study (KoWePs)
was used.
Participants: This study analysed 14 267 participants
at baseline (2006).
Interventions: The individuals were categorised into
four health insurance status groups: continuous health
insurance, change from health insurance to Medical
Aid, change from Medical Aid to health insurance, or
continuous Medical Aid.
Primary and secondary outcome measures:
Three dependent variables were also analysed: days
spent in hospital; number of outpatient visits; and
hospitalisations per year. Longitudinal data analysis
was used to determine whether changes in health
insurance status were associated with healthcare
utilisation.
Results: The number of outpatient visits per year was
0.1.363 times higher (p<0.0001) in the continuous
Medical Aid than in the continuous health insurance
group. The number of hospitalisations per year was
1.560 times higher (p<0.001) in new Medical Aid and
−0.636 times lower (p<0.001) in new health insurance
than in continuous health insurance group. The
number of days spent in hospital per year was −0.567
times lower (p=0.021) in the new health insurance
than in the continuous health insurance group.
Conclusions: Health insurance beneficiaries with a
coverage level lower than Medical Aid showed lower
healthcare utilisation, as measured by the number of
hospitalisations and days spent in hospital per year.
INTRODUCTION
National Health Insurance (NHI) was insti-
tuted in South Korea in 1977, and universal
coverage was achieved in 1989. Korea has a
unique healthcare system, in which the
private sector comprises most of the coun-
try’s health resources—88% of beds and
91% of specialists in Korea—but they are
generally funded by public ﬁnancing, such as
NHI and the national aid programme,1
although the patient’s co-payment is high.
Healthcare organisations in Korea are cate-
gorised into four types: tertiary care hospi-
tals, general hospitals, hospitals and clinics,
according to the scale of the operator:
number of beds. The entire Korean popula-
tion has access to both, the public and
private hospital sectors.1
One problem facing the NHI programme
is the low-beneﬁt coverage. Although all
Korean citizens are covered either through
the NHI (∼96%) or Medical Aid (∼4%), the
proportion of government expenditures out
of total health expenditures is only 55.3%,
compared to the average of 72.5% among
other Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD)
member countries.2 One reason for this phe-
nomenon is the low contribution rate to the
NHI (5.89% of payroll income in 2013),3
which reﬂects the low economic develop-
ment level of South Korea in 1977, when the
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ The study used nationwide longitudinal survey
data of a community-dwelling population. The
large population sample size was representative
of the overall population, so these results can be
generalised to the population in South Korea.
▪ Respondent reports are subjective and imperfect
measures, potentially affected by perception bias
and adaptation of resources.
▪ Because data from an existing national survey
were used, this study was limited to questions
that were already in the survey and could not
alter or add additional questions.
▪ There is no indication of the point in time for
such changes in insurance status, and the possi-
bility of multiple changes over 7 years was not
properly addressed.
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NHI programme was started. The low contribution rate
results in non-covered medical services.4 Out-of-pocket
expenses have increased despite the government’s
efforts to expand the beneﬁt coverage, and the medical
practice patterns are distorted because of the dispropor-
tionate expansion of non-covered services.3
In South Korea, health insurance costs have increased
from 5.5% in 2007 to 14.3% in 2009, and the hospital
visit lengths of stay (LOS) have also increased gradually.5
The healthcare budgets of Korea6 and the USA7 have
also increased dramatically. Despite this, the government
supports low-income groups that occupy a health insur-
ance blind spot. To strengthen the protection of such
groups, the government created Medical Aid, a social
safety net similar to Medicaid or Medicare in the USA.
Types 1 and 2 Medical Aid beneﬁciaries are compen-
sated by the government for their medical expenses,
excluding co-payments, as established by law. Types 1
and 2 Medical Aid beneﬁciaries differ in their capacity
to work, which is reﬂected in the amount of their
co-payments speciﬁed by law.8
In South Korea, the total medical expenditures for
types 1 and 2 Medical Aid beneﬁciaries increased dra-
matically from 3.9 trillion won in 2006 to 5.1 trillion in
2011.9 To address the growing cost of Medical Aid bene-
ﬁciaries,8 the Korean government implemented a
co-payment scheme in July 2007, whereby type 1 beneﬁ-
ciaries were required to pay outpatient fees of $1
(approximately 1000 KRW) to primary medical institu-
tions (co-payment of health insurance beneﬁciaries:
30%), $1.50 to secondary medical institutions
(co-payment of health insurance beneﬁciaries: 35–40%)
and $2 to tertiary medical institutions (co-payment of
health insurance beneﬁciaries: 50%).10 Despite this,
medical expenditures have continued to increase in
accordance with the proliferation of low-income house-
holds receiving government support.11 In addition, to
prevent unmet healthcare needs, the government also
implemented the Healthy Life Maintenance Aid
Program, which provides $6 /month to each type 1
beneﬁciary via a virtual account. This programme is
effectively a health savings account: whenever beneﬁciar-
ies receive a medical service as an outpatient, they make
a co-payment via the virtual account. If the beneﬁciaries
spend the total amount available in the virtual account,
they must pay the additional costs themselves. Any
money remaining in the virtual account cannot be con-
verted to cash.10
Despite this, medical expenditures have continued to
increase in accordance with the proliferation of low-
income households receiving government support.11
One reason for the proliferation of low-income house-
holds is the economic recession.12 13 Health insurance
status changes (from health insurance to Medical Aid)
have resulted from the economic recession, which
brought higher rates of unemployment and transient
employment, along with entitlement programme
cutbacks.14
A previous study indicated that changes in the health
insurance status may cause a paradoxical increase in
healthcare utilisation by creating a ‘moral hazard’ or by
increasing use of services that had previously been
deferred.15 16 This type of health insurance ‘churning’
results in populations of newly insured and newly unin-
sured individuals who, for various reasons, can struggle
with access to healthcare utilisation.17 18
In this study, based on the ﬁndings of prior investiga-
tions, which suggested changes in the overall healthcare
use after the gain14 or loss15 of insurance, it was
hypothesised that any changes in the health insurance
status (from health insurance to Medical Aid or from
Medical Aid to health insurance) would be associated
with healthcare utilisation. Therefore, this study exam-
ined the medical care utilisation patterns of health
insurance beneﬁciaries according to their health insur-
ance status changes.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study sample
The data from the ongoing Korean Welfare Panel Study
(KoWePS), which was conducted by the Korean Institute
of Social and Health Affairs in conjunction with the
Social Welfare Research Institute of Seoul National
University, were employed. The study was designed to
obtain nationally representative information on the
household ﬁnancial status, housing, pension funds,
employment histories, use of welfare services, health
conditions and more. The panel consisted of 18 856
individuals from a national probability sample of 7072
households residing in South Korea who have been sur-
veyed annually since 2006 and it lasted for 7 years. The
sample was selected using systematic two-stage stratiﬁed
cluster sampling on the 2005 census data. KoWePS
includes the post-stratiﬁcation weights based on 2005
census data; it is weighted by (1) a primary sampling
unit and (2) for the intentional oversampling of low-
income households. All results were estimated using the
sample weights. To date, data from the ﬁrst seven waves
of the KoWePS have been released publicly, and the
follow-up rate (original sample retention) for the 1st to
7th wave was 100.0%, 92.1%, 86.7%, 83.9%, 80.3%,
75.4% and 74.5%. This study did not require protocol
approval or informed consent.
Among the 2006 baseline data, we excluded 4587 indi-
viduals aged 20 years or more and 2 individuals without
information on number of outpatient visits and number
of hospitalisations. Thus, the 2006 baseline data
included a total of 14 267 individuals.
Study variables
To analyse the association between the health insurance
status changes and healthcare utilisation, the health
insurance status in the previous year was compared with
the health insurance status in the following year, over
7 years. Types 1 and 2 Medical Aid beneﬁciaries were
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both classiﬁed as Medical Aid recipients. Health insur-
ance status was categorised into four groups: continuous
health insurance beneﬁciaries (reference group), new
Medical Aid beneﬁciaries (ie, a change from health
insurance to Medical Aid), new health insurance beneﬁ-
ciaries (ie, a change from Medical Aid to health insur-
ance) and continuous Medical Aid beneﬁciaries.
This study analysed three dependent variables: days
spent in the hospital, number of outpatient visits, and
hospitalisations per year. Age, education level, residential
region, occupation, marital status, economic activity
status, disability, number of chronic disease, perceived
health status and year, were included in the analyses as
covariates. The education level was categorised into four
groups: elementary school or lower, middle school, high
school and college or higher. The residential regions
were categorised as urban (Seoul, Daejeon, Daegu,
Busan, Incheon, Kwangju or Ulsan) or rural (not classi-
ﬁed as a city). The occupation status was divided into
two categories: employed and unemployed (including
housewives and students). Individuals were classiﬁed as
currently married or single, the latter group included
the previously married, widowed and divorced. Number
of chronic diseases and perceived health status were also
included in these models. Number of chronic diseases
was operationalised into three different categories: 0, 1
and 2 or more. The perceived health status was cate-
gorised as good, average, or bad, in response to the
question ‘How do you usually perceive your health?’.
Statistical analysis
A Wilcoxon rank-sum test and longitudinal data analysis
were used to determine if the health insurance status
changes were associated with the healthcare utilisation
patterns (ie, number of days spent in the hospital, out-
patient visits and hospitalisations per year). In the
models presented, only the intercept was allowed to vary
between the participants, and the regression slopes were
assumed to be ﬁxed effects; random intercept models
were applied to the data. The random intercept variance
was reported to be σ2.19 To determine if the probability
of healthcare utilisation had changed with time, time
(year) was included in the model as a categorical
covariate.
A generalised estimating equation model with
zero-inﬂated function was run to investigate the number
of outpatient visits and hospitalisations per year, and
days spent in hospital per year. For all analyses, the cri-
terion for signiﬁcance was p≤0.05, two tailed. All ana-
lyses were conducted using the SAS statistical software
package V.9.2 (SAS Institute Inc, Cary, North Carolina,
USA).
RESULTS
Of the 14 267 research subjects at the baseline (2006),
tables 1 and 2 show the general characteristics of the
participants. The weighted mean of the number of
Table 1 General characteristics of the dependent
variables at the baseline (2006)
Mean Mean* SD†
Number of outpatient visits 14.21 10.41 23.94
Number of hospitalisations 0.16 0.13 0.59
Hospital days 3.21 2.58 16.93
*Weighted mean.
†Weighted SD.
Table 2 General characteristics of the study subjects at
baseline (2006)
N
Per
cent
Per
cent*
Type of insurance
Health insurance 13 349 93.57 96.38
Medical aid 918 6.43 3.62
Gender
Male 6502 45.57 46.96
Female 7765 54.43 53.04
Age, years
20–29 1859 13.03 15.07
30–39 2919 20.46 25.74
40–49 2583 18.10 21.11
50–59 2063 14.46 14.30
60–69 2492 17.47 13.35
≥70 2351 16.48 10.42
Residential region
Urban 6523 45.72 47.63
Rural 7744 54.28 52.37
Marital status
Married 9586 67.19 70.03
Single (including divorced,
widowed, separation)
4681 32.81 29.97
Education level
≤Elementary 4475 31.37 35.26
Middle school 1638 11.48 33.73
High school 4304 30.17 10.42
≥College 3850 26.99 20.59
Number of household members
1–2 5500 38.55 29.16
3–4 7062 49.50 57.94
≥5 1705 11.95 12.90
Number of chronic diseases
0 9196 64.46 73.09
1 116 0.81 0.71
≥2 4955 34.73 26.21
Perceived health status
Good 8080 56.63 65.82
Average 1905 13.35 12.94
Bad 4282 30.01 21.24
economic activity status
Yes 6842 47.96 47.52
No (including housewife
and students)
7425 52.04 52.48
Disability
Yes 1190 8.34 6.45
No 13 077 91.66 93.55
Total 14 267 100.00 100.00
*Weighted per cent.
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outpatient visits was 10.41 (SD 23.94) per year, the
weighted mean of the number of hospitalisations was
0.13 (SD 0.59) per year and the weighted mean of the
number of days spent in hospital was 2.58 (SD 16.93)
per year (table 1). Of the 14 267 research subjects at the
baseline (2006), 13 349 (96.38%) had health insurance
and 918 (3.62%) received Medical Aid (table 2).
Table 3 lists the general characteristics of the health
insurance status change over time. In 2012, of the
11 356 research subjects, those with continuous health
insurance and continuous Medical Aid were 10 061
(93.35%) and 587 (5.17%), respectively, and newly
Medical Aid and newly health insurance were 60
(0.53%) and 108 (0.95%), respectively.
Table 4 lists the association between all variables and
the health insurance status. The weighted mean number
of outpatient visits for the continuous health insurance
beneﬁciaries was 15.04 (SD 27.09). The weighted mean
number of outpatient visits for the new Medical Aid
beneﬁciaries was 29.08 (SD 44.57). The weighted mean
number of outpatient visits for the new health insurance
beneﬁciaries was 23.54 (SD 38.26). The weighted mean
number of outpatient visits for the continuous Medical
Aid beneﬁciaries was 32.45 (SD 45.00). The weighted
mean number of hospitalisations for the continuous and
new health insurance beneﬁciaries was 0.16 and 0.21,
respectively. The weighted mean number of hospitalisa-
tions for the new and continuous Medical Aid beneﬁ-
ciaries was 0.42 and 0.35, respectively. The weighted
mean number of days spent in hospital per year was 2.82
for continuous health insurance beneﬁciaries, 9.59 for
the new Medical Aid beneﬁciaries, 6.14 for the new
health insurance beneﬁciaries and 8.21 for the continu-
ous Medical Aid beneﬁciaries (table 4).
An analysis of the research sample in each year is pre-
sented in table 4 (2007: 12 992, 2008: 12 487, 2009:
12 241, 2010: 11 867, 2011: 11 350, 2012: 11 356).
Table 5 shows the association between the health insur-
ance status changes and healthcare utilisation patterns.
The number of outpatient visits per year was 1.363
times higher (p <0.0001) in the continuous Medical Aid
beneﬁciaries than in the individuals with continuous
Health Insurance. The number of hospitalisations per
year was 1.560 and 1.144 times higher (p 0.001, 0.159)
in the new Medical Aid and continuous Medical Aid,
respectively, and 0.636 times lower (p value 0.001) in
the continuous Medical Aid beneﬁciaries than in the
individuals with continuous health insurance.
The number of days spent in hospital per year was
0.567 times lower (p=0.021) in the individuals with new
Health Insurance than in the individuals with continu-
ous health insurance and 1.152 times higher (p value:
0.329) in the continuous Medical Aid beneﬁciaries than
in the individuals with continuous Health Insurance
(table 5).
DISCUSSION
This study examined whether the health insurance
status changes (from health insurance to Medical Aid or
from Medical Aid to health insurance) affect the health-
care utilisation patterns using the KoWePS data (2006–
2012). In this longitudinal cohort study, compared to
those with continuous health insurance, (1) continuous
Medical Aid beneﬁciaries were more likely to make out-
patient visits and (2) new Medical Aid beneﬁciaries were
more likely to be hospitalised and new health insurance
beneﬁciaries was less likely to be hospitalised. New
health insurance recipients also spent fewer days in the
hospital than the individuals with continuous health
insurance.
In theory,20 newly insured adults should have new
access to primary care services for acute and preventive
care needs, resulting in a decrease in the unmet need
for healthcare services; however, the results indicate that
Medical Aid beneﬁciaries with relatively high beneﬁts
and low co-payments have a high likelihood of health-
care utilisation and, inversely, health insurance beneﬁ-
ciaries with relatively low medical service coverage level
tended to decrease their healthcare utilisation.
A US study20 comparing healthcare utilisation by
health insurance type showed that, as the coverage level
increased, the utilisation of healthcare services increased
signiﬁcantly, which is consistent with the present results.
Table 3 Changes in health insurance status over time
Health
insurance
status change
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
N
Per
cent N
Per
cent N
Per
cent N
Per
cent N
Per
cent N
Per
cent
Continuous
health insurance
11 985 93.35 11 466 91.82 11 233 91.77 10 907 91.91 10 558 93.02 10 601 93.35
Newly Medical
Aid
105 0.53 89 0.71 78 0.64 109 0.92 44 0.39 60 0.53
Newly health
insurance
89 0.95 74 0.59 129 1.05 159 1.34 91 0.80 108 0.95
Continuous
Medical Aid
813 5.17 858 6.87 801 6.54 692 5.83 657 5.79 587 5.17
Total 12 992 100.00 12 487 100.00 12 241 100.0 11 867 100.0 11 350 100.0 11 356 100.0
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Table 4 Association between the variables and health insurance status
Number of
outpatient
visits
p Value
Number of
hospitalisations
p Value
Hospital
days
p ValueN Mean* SD† Mean* SD† Mean* SD†
Health insurance status change <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Continuous health insurance 66 750 15.04 27.09 0.16 0.61 2.82 16.65
Newly Medical Aid 485 29.08 44.57 0.42 1.18 9.59 32.53
Newly health insurance 650 23.54 38.26 0.21 0.69 6.14 26.32
Continuous Medical Aid 4408 32.45 45.00 0.35 1.04 8.21 34.07
Gender <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Male 32 616 11.70 22.77 0.17 0.66 3.57 21.00
Female 39 677 20.04 32.93 0.18 0.65 2.94 16.14
Age, years <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
20–29 8191 4.42 9.27 0.09 0.48 0.87 7.00
30–39 12 649 5.95 12.90 0.12 0.50 1.29 12.23
40–49 12 945 8.09 17.34 0.11 0.52 1.89 15.59
50–59 10 574 14.43 23.97 0.16 0.64 2.85 16.35
60–69 11 745 24.60 34.21 0.21 0.73 4.56 22.26
≥70 16 189 32.05 40.40 0.30 0.84 6.28 25.28
Residential region <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Urban 31 389 14.24 26.51 0.16 0.61 2.92 19.51
Rural 40 904 17.84 30.84 0.19 0.69 3.46 17.67
Marital status 0.0266 <0.0001 0.0001
Married 47 013 14.96 26.28 0.18 0.65 3.04 17.73
Single (including divorced,
widowed, separation)
25 280 18.72 33.57 0.17 0.66 3.57 19.82
Education level <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
≤Elementary 22 862 30.29 39.57 0.27 0.83 5.81 25.04
Middle school 8244 17.50 27.89 0.18 0.65 3.24 18.17
High school 20 804 9.98 19.88 0.14 0.51 2.27 14.73
≥College 20 383 6.48 13.05 0.11 0.54 1.30 11.92
Number of household members <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
1–2 29 161 25.27 36.38 0.25 0.80 5.03 23.58
3–4 34 413 9.92 20.19 0.12 0.51 2.00 14.00
≥5 8719 11.28 22.94 0.12 0.56 2.01 13.51
Scale of chronic disease <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Increase 8657 18.75 25.91 0.23 0.65 3.99 18.07
Decrease 6261 10.06 19.25 0.14 0.50 2.66 18.32
Constant 57 375 16.58 30.32 0.17 0.67 3.17 18.56
Perceived health status <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Good 40 272 6.70 12.91 0.08 0.33 0.83 7.15
Average 14 388 19.01 26.23 0.14 0.44 2.05 11.29
Bad 17 633 35.92 43.89 0.43 1.12 9.65 33.55
Economic activity status <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Yes 35 127 21.80 34.38 0.25 0.84 5.20 24.71
No (including housewife and
students)
37 166 11.06 21.76 0.10 0.39 1.36 8.99
Disability <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Yes 7582 27.63 39.73 0.37 0.97 10.11 37.34
No 64 711 14.95 27.27 0.15 0.60 2.42 14.57
Year <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
2007 12 992 16.52 30.20 0.16 0.69 2.96 18.80
2008 12 487 15.41 27.10 0.18 0.68 3.40 21.18
2009 12 241 15.48 28.31 0.19 0.69 3.74 20.81
2010 11 867 16.32 29.41 0.17 0.61 3.45 18.40
2011 11 350 16.87 29.74 0.17 0.63 2.75 14.75
2012 11 356 17.17 29.71 0.18 0.61 3.03 15.51
*Weighted mean.
†Weighted SD.
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Table 5 Adjusted effect of study variables on healthcare utilisation pattern
Number of outpatient visits Number of hospitalisations Hospital days
OR 95% CI p Value OR 95% CI p Value OR 95% CI p Value
Health insurance status change
Continuous health
insurance
1.000 1.000 1.000
Newly Medical Aid 1.245 0.926 1.675 0.147 1.560 1.190 2.043 0.001 1.287 0.665 2.490 0.454
Newly health
insurance
1.005 0.857 1.179 0.948 0.636 0.489 0.828 0.001 0.567 0.350 0.916 0.021
Continuous Medical
Aid
1.363 1.217 1.527 <0.0001 1.144 0.949 1.380 0.159 1.152 0.867 1.532 0.329
Gender
Male 1.000 1.000 1.000
Female 1.457 1.384 1.535 <0.0001 1.033 0.946 1.128 0.467 0.809 0.666 0.982 0.032
Age, years
20–29 1.000 1.000 1.000
30–39 1.096 1.009 1.192 0.030 1.187 1.002 1.407 0.048 1.281 0.858 1.914 0.227
40–49 1.050 0.957 1.152 0.303 0.773 0.640 0.933 0.007 0.849 0.506 1.426 0.537
50–59 1.177 1.057 1.310 0.003 0.687 0.556 0.850 0.001 0.765 0.462 1.266 0.297
60–69 1.293 1.145 1.461 <0.0001 0.559 0.442 0.706 <0.0001 0.638 0.374 1.088 0.099
≥70 1.430 1.243 1.644 <0.0001 0.587 0.470 0.734 <0.0001 0.834 0.512 1.358 0.466
Residential region
Urban 1.007 0.960 1.057 0.763 0.868 0.801 0.940 0.001 0.775 0.659 0.911 0.002
Rural 1.000 1.000 1.000
Marital status
Married 1.265 1.192 1.341 <0.0001 1.552 1.394 1.728 <0.0001 1.578 1.162 2.143 0.004
Single (including
divorced, widowed,
separation)
1.000 1.000 1.000
Education level
≤Elementary 1.151 1.047 1.266 0.004 0.998 0.848 1.173 0.978 1.774 1.313 2.397 0.000
Middle school 1.003 0.923 1.091 0.940 0.932 0.795 1.093 0.388 1.825 1.308 2.546 0.000
High school 0.972 0.917 1.029 0.329 1.026 0.916 1.150 0.654 1.665 1.315 2.107 <0.0001
≥College 1.000 1.000 1.000
Number of household members
1–2 1.097 1.017 1.184 0.016 1.495 1.292 1.729 <0.0001 1.324 0.981 1.787 0.067
3–4 0.967 0.903 1.036 0.342 1.031 0.903 1.177 0.649 0.849 0.633 1.138 0.273
≥5 1.000 1.000 1.000
Number of chronic diseases
0 0.307 0.291 0.325 <0.0001 0.536 0.485 0.593 <0.0001 0.504 0.407 0.624 <0.0001
1 0.697 0.648 0.749 <0.0001 1.292 1.116 1.495 0.001 1.297 0.949 1.773 0.103
≥2 1.000 1.000 1.000
Perceived health status
Good 1.000 1.000 1.000
Average 1.523 1.447 1.603 <0.0001 1.435 1.300 1.584 <0.0001 1.651 1.364 1.997 <0.0001
Bad 2.170 1.997 2.359 <0.0001 3.782 3.362 4.253 <0.0001 5.655 4.717 6.782 <0.0001
Economic activity status
Yes 1.000 1.000 1.000
No (including
housewife and
students)
0.955 0.910 1.002 0.061 1.437 1.316 1.570 <0.0001 1.331 1.091 1.623 0.005
Disability
Yes 1.154 1.047 1.273 0.004 1.203 1.053 1.375 0.007 1.487 1.188 1.860 0.001
No 1.000 1.000 1.000
Year
2007 1.000 1.000 1.000
2008 0.946 0.900 0.994 0.029 1.115 1.006 1.235 0.039 1.151 0.915 1.448 0.228
2009 0.897 0.846 0.952 0.000 1.245 1.118 1.387 <0.0001 1.243 0.949 1.628 0.115
2010 0.992 0.938 1.048 0.766 1.116 1.000 1.245 0.050 1.262 0.951 1.674 0.107
2011 0.995 0.939 1.053 0.856 1.085 0.966 1.219 0.167 1.132 0.863 1.486 0.369
2012 1.055 0.991 1.123 0.096 1.251 1.119 1.399 <0.0001 1.188 0.930 1.517 0.167
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One possible explanation for these results based on a
previous study is that individuals may defer care prior to
obtaining Medical Aid, which reduces the ﬁnancial
barrier to the healthcare services, leading to a period of
increased use.15 Another potential explanation is that
individuals with Medical Aid have health problems that
caused their loss of employment8 and that also result in
a high probability of requiring medical care. The lower
number of hospitalisations and hospital days observed
for the new health insurance beneﬁciaries having ﬁnan-
cial barrier to use of the healthcare services can be
explained by the relatively low income of these indivi-
duals (having previously qualiﬁed for Medical Aid), who
may have pre-existing health problems.3
An economic recession can affect medical care utilisa-
tion patterns by contributing to the loss of employment
and the instability of associated health insurance cover-
age.20 Generally, in choosing to seek medical care, indi-
viduals weigh the ﬁnancial cost of treatment against
their perceived health beneﬁts.21
Prior evidence supports the idea that, in addition to
possessing health insurance coverage, the consistency of
insurance provision is important for improving the health
outcomes and reducing the need for hospitalisation
through better access to outpatient services.22 Previous
research in the USA also suggested that newly enrolled
Medicaid recipients use more medical care than new
enrolees in other forms of health insurance.20 Finally,
previous studies show that increased co-payments lead to
a decrease in the utilisation of medical services.23 24
Therefore, implementing the medical savings account
and deductible programmes may help control the
demand for medical care.6 In terms of supply, pay for
performance (P4P) may also be a potential solution.6
Because medical savings accounts and P4P programmes
are both available to reveal medical care costs, they may
be considered effective for improvement of healthcare
quality and reduction of unnecessary healthcare services
that result from health insurance coverage change.25–27
The theory behind medical saving accounts is that
giving individuals more control over the funds allocated
for healthcare services will cause them to spend the
money more responsibly, particularly once they become
more educated about the actual cost of health services.
Furthermore, these accounts can be used as tax-
advantaged vehicles to save for healthcare expenses in
retirement. A previous study indicated that the number
of individuals with medical saving accounts increased
from 6.6 million to 7.2 million between 2012 and 2013.
Between 2012 and 2013, the assets in medical saving
accounts increased from $11.3 billion to $16.6 billion.
In addition, the P4P programme has become an
increasingly popular reimbursement mechanism to
improve the quality of care and healthcare reform.28–30
The P4P programmes provide incentives to healthcare
providers for achieving selected performance targets,
such as improving preventive and chronic care, patient
experience and the use of information technology.28–30
The broad goal of these programmes is to enhance
healthcare quality, which is expected to improve
patients’ long-term health and reduce healthcare
costs.28–30 Such promising goals have placed the P4P
programmes at the forefront of many recent healthcare
reforms. Hospital ﬁnances could change under P4P in
indirect ways, such as reputational effects that could
increase the hospital volume and thus revenues.28–30 On
the contrary, payers and policymakers have increasingly
realised that, for P4P to be successful and sustainable, it
must, at worst, be cost neutral and, at best, cost saving.
Therefore, it is important to evaluate the effects of P4P
on the costs of care.28–30
The number of Medical Aid beneﬁciaries with a high
level of coverage, in South Korea, ﬂuctuates annually—it
was 1.5 million in 2004 and 1.7 million in 2008.
However, the cost of Medical Aid payments accounts for
16.9% of the total NHI expenditures,31 and has
increased, on average, by 15.9% annually from 2002 to
2006.8 In addition, the total health expenditures on
Medical Aid have increased dramatically, from 3.2 tril-
lion won in 2005 to 5.1 trillion in 2011.9 Despite this,
policymakers have attempted to reduce the burden of
co-payments for low-income patients and patients with
serious diseases, such as cancer and heart disease.9
Owing to the rise in income in South Korea over the
past 30 years, the health status has improved dramatic-
ally, with life expectancy at birth rising from 64.4 years in
1976 to 79.1 years in 2006. Accordingly, the total health
expenditures and medical care utilisation rates have
increased sharply.3 32 Unlike the USA, South Korea has
no mechanisms such as co-payments in long LOS or
days spent in hospital in place to control costs,27 result-
ing in a large number of outpatient visits, long LOS and
increasing total health expenditures.
South Korea’s level of beneﬁt coverage is low com-
pared to the OECD average.2 33 On the contrary, 85%
or more of medical costs are covered by patients with
Medical Aid.3 4 The risk of moral hazard in the insur-
ance system can be reduced by increasing the
co-payment amounts.34 Consequently, a moral hazard is
more likely to occur in Medical Aid patients than in
patients with health insurance.
With the health expenditure per person of US$7212
in 2011,35 the USA outspends all other countries by a
wide margin. The USA ranks ﬁrst in the OECD for
healthcare expenditure, but last for coverage.36 At the
same time, health expenditure growth was kept in line
with other high-spending OECD countries, which is
partly an effect of government policies, and partly that
of market forces. A retrenchment of coverage was on
other high-spending countries’ policy agendas, as they
faced the grim consequences of a severe economic
recession and ﬁscal crises, with accumulating public
debt.35 Many countries cut their healthcare budgets,
applied strict cost–control measures, froze salaries and
drug prices, cut any possible fringes off their beneﬁt
packages and increased co-payments.35
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Medical Aid beneﬁciaries with high levels of beneﬁt
coverage may increase their healthcare use, and can
maximise beneﬁts without incurring out-of-pocket
costs.37 Given the original goal of the Korean medical
care system, that is, to provide a minimum safety net to
ensure the medical security of low-income citizens, pol-
icymakers must determine if the health insurance
status changes affect the healthcare utilisation patterns
among Medical Aid beneﬁciaries. In addition, because
health policy changes and economic recession are
expected to create change in health insurance status
resulting in increasing healthcare utilisation, policy-
makers and healthcare administrators should anticipate
new surges in healthcare use. Consistency in provision
and health insurance type may improve access to
healthcare services and reduce patient reliance on
healthcare services.20 38
This study had some limitations. First, the analysis
failed to consider medical care providers, focusing
instead on beneﬁciary-related factors that inﬂuence
medical care usage. Second, because data from an exist-
ing national survey were used, this study was limited to
questions that were already in the survey and could not
alter or add additional questions. Third, because the
KoWePS is based on self-reported data, the answers are
subject to recall bias. Fourth, there is neither indication
of the point in time for such changes in insurance status
nor was the possibility of multiple changes over 7 years
properly addressed. Therefore, the four insurance cat-
egories are rather arbitrary, particularly for those people
whose status has changed.
CONCLUSION
Health insurance beneﬁciaries with a coverage level
lower than that of Medical Aid beneﬁciaries showed
lower healthcare utilisation, as measured by the number
of hospitalisations and days spent in the hospital per
year. Policymakers should anticipate an increase in
medical care utilisation because the current changes in
health policy or economic circumstances are expected
to create health insurance status changes.
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